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ABSTRACT
The research beings with a discussion of the legal framework for defense
reform in 2003 and in 2005 followed by an analysis of the role of the Parliamentary
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in implementing the legislation for reform.
The analysis focuses on efforts to build the capacity of the Parliamentary
Assembly and asks the question: have the efforts to build the capacity of
parliamentary oversight of the defense reform implementation been successful in
increasing democratic control of the Armed Forces of BiH?
I conclude that yes, the capacity-building efforts have been successful in
increasing democratic control. However, the Parliamentary Assembly needs to take a
more critical approach toward the Ministry of Defense and other actors in the politicomilitary scene and should use the political tools at its disposal: inquiries, hearings,
withholding appointments, budget cuts, or legislative deals to ensure proper
implementation of the defense reform. Only in this way will democratic control
remain stable despite the gradual pullout of international forces such as the Office of
the High Representative.
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METHODOLOGY
I approached this paper hoping to gain a greater understanding of the military
reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially the Parliamentary Assembly’s role
in overseeing that reform process. Part of this process was to gain general knowledge
of theoretical issues of the role of legislative bodies in overseeing and implementing
the laws such bodies pass.
In addition to theory, I also had to gain an understanding of the history of the
Parliamentary Assembly’s oversight capacity. I chose to focus my observation on the
Parliamentary Assembly’s role since the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords in 1995 that
ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
The document created in Dayton and signed in Paris, the General Framework
Agreement for Peace, created a new constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina and
therefore started the parliamentary system on a new path. Not only did the war’s end
change the nature of the government in BiH, but also the disintegration of the
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and BiH’s declaration of
independence in 1992 gave the country a new direction toward democracy and away
from communism.
With the country’s history in mind, I decided that detailed observation of the
role of the state legislative body prior to 1995 was not particularly relevant to my
current research. However, the legacy of communism cannot be ignored, and I have
referred to that legacy in this work, though my research in that area is only just
beyond superficial.
In addition to background on the Parliamentary Assembly since 1995, I also
researched a detailed background of the military reform since it officially began in
2003. I first to established a secure background on the reasons for reform, the creation
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of a strategy for reform, and the status of the reform so far. The status of reform was
the most difficult to find literature on, as the most recent reform measures began in
January 2006. Therefore I expect that more information may come out at the end of
this year or early 2007. However, there is a great amount of information on the reform
up until the 2005 adjustments to the reform strategy.
Because of the lack of sufficient literature on the current status of the defense
reform implementation, I focused special attention in my interviews on this subject.
My interviews were a key component to my research, and I could not have done this
research without it. In an effort to get a full picture of the PA’s role in the reform, I
tried to talk to as many of the players in the defense reform implementation as I could.
In this way, I hoped to be able to weed out the facts from the political bias. I also tried
to speak with both internationals and native Bosnians to balance the mix of those
directly involved in the defense reform. About half of the people I spoke with were
Bosnian, and the other half from the international community. Those in the
international community were from Western European nations and the United States.
For a full list of interviewees, please see the interview list following this paper.
I had unfortunate timing in this research, because the Parliamentary Assembly
was not in session for much of my stay due to the October elections. The turnover has
recently taken place but was delayed during part of my research due to the one party’s
inability to come to a consensus on the Speaker. Because of the turnover and the
delay, I was unable to speak with an elected representative in the Parliamentary
Assembly (PA). However, I did speak with Mr. Željko Grubešić, the PA Expert on
Defense and Security Matters. Mr. Grubešić works with the PA’s Joint Committee on
Defense and Security and was able to offer greater insight into the Committee’s
activities and capacities.
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PREFACE
I came to this research with little background knowledge on the nature of the
armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina following Dayton or of the efforts to reform
those forces since 2003. Because my knowledge of military issues was limited, I came
with few notions about what such reform should look like and why. However, while
this allowed me a fresh eye, it may also have detracted from my ability to be critical
of the reforms, and I had little or no basis for such criticism.
My topical background consisted mostly of an understanding of the 19921995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the political structure as it existed following
Dayton. My political understanding of the country’s recent history, though, allowed
me to understand the specific challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina with which
many other countries confronting military reform have not had to confront. The
defense reform in BiH has been and continues to be an extremely sensitive topic, and
the background I had from living in and studying the region helped me approach my
research with sensitivity.
I looked at key international documents that describe the nature of militaries
and democratic control of defense. I am fully aware that most of these documents,
though not all, were written and published by Euro-Atlantic organizations, giving me
a predominantly Western view of military matters. Considering the BiH government’s
primary motivation for reforming the military – to join NATO’s Partnership-forPeace program – a Western view is particularly relevant. However I accept that
NATO’s requirements and therefore the reform’s Euro-Atlantic approach to reform
may not be the universal best. I am in no position to make such a judgment and will
not attempt to in this paper, though I acknowledge that such a debate may be relevant.
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Recognizing my limitations in having a Western approach, I tried in my
interviews to get a balance of opinions between Bosnians and internationals. This, of
course, does not mean that my viewpoint was any less Western, but by weighing both
sides I gained a fuller understanding of the Bosnian point of view as it related to
Euro-Atlantic approaches.
My hope is that I have accurately described here the challenges and successes
of Bosnians and internationals alike in reforming the defense structure in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War and more recently the terrorist attacks on 11
September 2001, the nature of security and defense has rapidly changed throughout
the world. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s security situation was unique and
especially challenging. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), like most other nations in the
world has had to confront emerging defense in the twenty-first century. In addition,
BiH, like other post-socialist states has had to confront the process of transition from
communism in both military and political scenes. On top of these challenges, which
are not unique to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country has had to deal with the
repercussions and domestic military changes resulting from the 1992-1995 war. Those
involved in the country’s military reform have had the unique challenge of taking on
post-socialist, post-conflict, and twenty-first century security dilemmas all at once,
making the reforms both exceptionally difficult and indeed making a successful
reform that much more remarkable.
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has created the most complex dimensions
in this particular reform. The war has been described in many ways: civil war, war of
secession, war of aggression. In 1992, based on a nationwide referendum, Bosnia and
Herzegovina declared independence from the shrinking Yugoslavia. Some Bosnian
Serbs did not want to be independent from Yugoslavia, and Bosnian Serb leaders
decided that Serb-held territory would secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because
most of BiH was multiethnic at the time, territory became a key goal in the war. Fullscale warfare broke out in 1992 following the referendum and continued until 1995.
By 1995, the war had seen three sides: the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims also
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called Bosniacs1, and the Bosnian Croats. Involvement from neighboring states is
disputed but largely accepted as true.
When the war ended, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina split into two
entities under one federal government: the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). While remaining united under a central
government, the two entities remained fairly separate. Each entity even had it’s own
military force.
Agreements at the Dayton Peace Accords allowed the existence of three
separate military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat Defense Council Forces, and the Army of
Republika Srpska. However, before long the Croat Defense Council Forces and the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina joined to create the Army of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was controlled by the FBiH entity.
While technically united, these two armies remained practically separated, and of
course, the Army of the Federation was still very much separated from the Army of
Republika Srpska, that is until the recent reforms.
The defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects so many of the
challenges – and successes – in the country since Dayton: unity, integration,
democracy, and Euro-Atlantic accession. This particular reform has been an
especially telling challenge of BiH’s capacity to confront these obstacles, and this
research looks into the government’s ability and success in approaching such
challenges.
The goals of the military reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina were clear from
the start: Partnership for Peace (PfP) and eventually NATO membership. And one

1

See note (d).
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major condition for PfP membership was democratic civilian control of the armed
forces. Commonly accepted theory requires that responsibility for democratic control
lies in parliaments where state-level representation of civilians is highest.
All players in the reform’s implementation understand the need for
parliamentary oversight of the military in order to achieve membership in PfP, so the
question remains: have the efforts to build the capacity of parliamentary oversight of
the defense reform implementation been successful in increasing democratic control
of the Armed Forces of BiH?
The Parliamentary Assembly (PA)2 and its supporters have made great strides
in legislation, budget control, and on MPs’ knowledge of defense and security
matters, all three of which are cited by George Katsirdakis, the Deputy Director of the
Defense Partnership and Cooperative Directorate of NATO’s Sector of Defense
Planning and Operations, as ways for Parliament to obtain and maintain democratic
control of armed forces.i
The implementation of reform is not yet complete, but the successes thus far
have been recognized and rewarded: at the NATO Riga Summit in November, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, along with Montenegro and Serbia, was invited to become a
member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.
Some of the greatest success has been in the establishment of democratic
control of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH)3, creating a more
stable security situation in BiH. However in order to show the government and the
2

While the entities’ legislative bodies are often referred to as parliamentary
assemblies (the Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of BiH and the
Parliamentary Assembly of Republika Srpska), when not otherwise specified in this
paper, Parliamentary Assembly refers to the state Parliamentary Assembly in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The same is true for the abbreviation PA.
3
The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) refers to the united army
created by the Defense Reform Commission’s 2005 recommendations and the 2005
legislation.
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public in BiH that the parliamentary oversight in BiH has more than an observation
deck, the Parliamentary Assembly must take action to effect change where change is
needed in the process of military reform and transition.

This paper will cover the facts and opinions of the defense reform in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. I will cover the background of defense in BiH since the end of the
1992-1995 war in BiH and the reasons for the defense reform. I will then cover the
reform itself in its two major phases, the first in 2003 and the second in 2005. I will
analyze the reforming legislation in both phases with special focus on the politicomilitary changes.
The main analysis will follow the description of reform with a discussion of
the recent and current efforts to build the capacity of the Parliamentary Assembly in
BiH to oversee the legislation’s implementation as well as the efficacy of the
capacity-building efforts. This section also looks at where the Parliamentary
Assembly can improve in its ability to oversee the military and defense reform, most
generally in addressing budget issues and on the MPs’ need to be more critical of the
Ministry of Defense.
The last section looks toward the future of the defense structure of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, especially in light of BiH’s recent invitation into NATO’s Partnership
for Peace Program.
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BACKGROUND

THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE
In 1995 representatives of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the
Federation of BiH, the Republika Srpska (RS), and other relevant parties signed the
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), otherwise known as the Dayton
Accords or the Dayton-Paris Accords. Among many other elements of GFAP, the
agreement effectively supported the existence of three separate armies in BiH: “The
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat Defense Council Forces,
and the Army of Republika Srpska,”ii as was often written in the agreement.
While GFAP does not specifically address whether military command is under
entity or state control, it does give more power of safety and security to the Entities
than to the State. Included in concerns of the State is “international and inter-Entity
criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol.”iii This control of
criminal law enforcement, referring to what are typically considered police rather than
military duties, is the only power granted to the State in terms of security.
However, the Entities have a broader base for interpretation in their powers of
security:
The Entities shall provide a safe and secure environment for all
persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law
enforcement agencies…and by taking such other measures as
appropriate.iv
Vague as this statement might be, in light of the recognition of three separate armies
within the State, the security powers of the State being confined to police activity, and
the ambiguity contained in the Entity’s ability to take “other measures,” the military
control seems to fall to the Entities.
Since GFAP does not specifically state under which government the command
of the military would lie, the military seems to have ended up lying somewhere
between state and entity governments or no government at all. However, GFAP did
11

establish a Joint Military Commission, which made a meager stab at providing some
unity in military discussions and at establishing some level of civilian control.
The Joint Military Commission (JMC) was established to “serve as the central
body for all Parties to this Annex to bring any military complaints, questions, or
problems that require resolution by the IFOR Commander.”v The JMC was chaired
and effectively controlled by the IFOR Commander. Sitting on the Commission were,
among others, the highest ranking military officials from each army as well as two
civilians selected from each of the three major constituencies.vi These six civilians
were the only Bosnian4 civilians who had any measure of control of the armed forces
within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4

‘Bosnian’ here and in all future references in this paper describes a person who lives
in or is from the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ‘Bosniac’ describes a Bosnian who
considers himself or herself of Muslim descent either religiously or culturally. The
term ‘Bosniac’ is often used when referring to the three major constituencies in
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs. Bosniac can also be spelled
Bosniak or Bosnjak.
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TRIGGERS FOR REFORM
In July 2001, the Presidency of BiH announced its firm intention to make
every effort to take all steps necessary to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program
(PfP), which is generally accepted to be a first step toward full NATO membership.vii
It formally expressed a desire to have BiH become a member of PfP, and “the
Presidency also expressed Bosnia and Herzegovina’s commitment to…the
implementation of defence reforms including restructuring of the Armed Forces.”viii
This statement got the government and internationals in BiH thinking about how to
reform the military.
However, no significant changes occurred until the discovery in 2002 of
certain politico-military scandals. One scandal was what is now referred to as the
ORAO affair. In 2002, it was discovered that the company VZ Orao, based in
Republika Srpska, had violated a UN Embargo on exporting weapons and other
military equipment to Iraq.ix
The other affair was when “SFOR found out that the intelligence services of
RS were spying on international officials in both Republika Srpska and the
Federation.”x The result of these two scandals was the resignation of the Serb member
of the BiH Presidency, Mirko Šarović in April 2003xi and the creation of the Defense
Reform Commission.
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DEFENSE REFORM COMMISSION
These scandals pushed defense reform to the top of the agenda. A month after
Mr. Šaravić’s resignation, the High Representative (HR)5 Paddy Ashdown created the
Defense Reform Commission (DRC)xii to assess the military and the necessities for its
reform in BiH.
Among other duties, the DRC was established to “examine the legal measures
necessary to reform defense structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, identify
constitutional and legislative provisions at variance with such requirements and
propose legislation” that meets the standards and goals to which the reform was
aimed. Among these goals are:
a) creating a defense system that meets NATO standards for PfP
membership;
b) creating a defense system with “democratic civil oversight of armed
forces”;
c) ensuring unified, state-level control of the AFBiH;
d) ensuring that the size and nature of the military is within the physical and
financial limits of Bosnia and Herzegovina.xiii
The HR’s mandate gave the DRC the ability to investigate the current status and
shortfalls of the military in BiH in order to have a full understanding of the
aforementioned “legal measures necessary” for reform. It also required that the
reforms move BiH toward greater involvement in Euro-Atlantic organizations such as
NATO, which was, and still is, the driving force for the BiH government in following
through with the reform.
5

The High Representative is appointed by relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions and serves to help the implementation of the General Framework
Agreement for Peace and to aid the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (General
Framework Agreement for Peace, Annex 10, Article 1.2). In a meeting in Bonn,
Germany, in December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council gave significantly
greater power to the High Representative. These powers, commonly referred to as the
Bonn Powers, allows the High Representative to make decisions “to dismiss
obstructive public officials and impose legislation if BiH’s legislative bodies fail do
so” (“Key Events Since Dayton”).
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With the OHR mandate, the Defense Reform Commission set to work, and by
September 2003 released their suggestions for reform in “The Path to Partnership for
Peace.”xiv This document laid out legislative suggestions that paved the way for the
2003 Law on Defense, a law that passed in both houses of the Parliamentary
Assembly of BiH in December 2003.xv
The implementation of reform began with the passage of the 2003 Law on
Defense, which is discussed in detail below. However, as the June 2004 NATO
Summit in Istanbul approached, High Representative Ashdown recognized the need
for more thorough and more rapid military reforms if BiH was to be taken as a serious
candidate for PfP membership in Istanbul. Therefore, in February 2004, the HR
extended the DRC’s mandate to include:
Supporting the establishment of new institutional structures
that will create a functioning and modern defence system. This
includes the full establishment of the Security Committee of the
Parliamentary Assembly, the adoption of Book of Rules for the State
Ministry of Defence, the Joint Staff and Operational Command, and
restructuring of the Entity Ministries of Defense.xvi
This mandate called on the DRC to support the reforms that had already been created
on paper in the 2003 Law on Defense, not to create new reforms.
Also included in the extension of the mandate was that the DRC should aid in
the “timely appointment of personnel” in the new structure, help create the necessary
budgets, help the Entities in inter-entity cooperation, creation of unified standards,
and restructuring in light of the reform, and “identifying additional reforms necessary
to further stabilizing the overall security situation.”xvii This extended mandate
essentially allows for the drafting of new proposals for reform as well as for the direct
involvement of the DRC in overseeing the implementation of reform.
In June 2004 the North Atlantic Council decided at the NATO Summit in
Istanbul to deny BiH membership into the Partnership for Peace until certain
15

measures were properly fulfilled, including further defense reform measures and
greater cooperation with the ICTY in arresting indicted war criminals. However, the
Council did recognize the major steps BiH and other membership-seeking countries
had taken in reforming the military and therefore created the Tailored Cooperation
Process (TCP) “as preparation for PfP membership.” The TCP allows BiH to work
with PfP in selected capacities, but TCP membership is not equal to or even part of
PfP membership and does not guarantee future membership.xviii
With confidence behind the start of reform but the acknowledgement that
more must change, the High Representative again extended the DRC’s mandate in
December 2004, this time with more specific instructions:
The Commission shall examine and propose the legal and
institutional measures necessary to enhance State level command and
control, promote cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, …achieve fiscal sustainability, strengthen
parliamentary over-sight, and promote development of a single
military force by transferring the competencies of the Entity Ministries
of Defence to the level of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
implement further the Commission’s recommendations…xix
This second extension of the mandate called on the DRC to be more than just support
the reform measures already in place. The DRC now was asked to make further
reforms. The mandate presented the DRC with much specific requests and required
that they be fulfilled not through helping hands but through new legislative measures.
So with such a request in hand, the DRC set to work and in September 2005
submitted its recommendations in the Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report,
which among other things outlined extensive amendments to the 2003 Law on
Defense. The 2005 Report will be discussed in detail below.
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REFORM

NATO’S PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM
One key motive behind focusing so much of the reform on ensuring that the
military existed under democratic civilian control was NATO membership, which
demands democratic control of armed forces. The Law states that all those in the
military and in the governmental chain of command of the military “shall conduct
required activities within their respective constitutional and legal authority, with the
aim of fulfilling the conditions for achieving a membership of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to NATO, by the start of the implementation of this Law.”xx
The first step to NATO membership is membership in NATO’s Partnership
for Peace Program (PfP). NATO has stated that in order for states to be invited to be a
member of PfP, it must have “transparency in national defence planning and
budgeting; democratic control of defence forces; preparedness for civil disasters and
other emergencies; and, development of interoperability and co-operation, including
NATO-led Partnership for Peace operations.”xxi
Those working on defense reform recognized these requirements and sought
out first where BiH lacked in these areas and how to improve in order to meet
NATO’s requirements.

19

WEAKNESSES UNDER GFAP
From the implementation of GFAP to the 2003 reforms, the military structure
in BiH remained essentially untouched, except for changes in the international
security forces such as the handovers of duties between IFOR, SFOR, and EUFOR.
When approaching military reform, the first step was to identify weaknesses in the
system as it existed under GFAP:
• Inadequate State-level command and control of the Armed Forces;
• Ambiguities and inconsistencies regarding State and entity
authorities in defence matters;
• Insufficient parliamentary oversight and control of the Armed
Forces;
• Lack of transparency in defence matters at all levels;
• Non-compliance with international commitments, particularly
politico-military aspects of relevant OSCE documents;
• The size, structure and equipment of the Armed Forces, which were
not commensurate with real defence and security requirements;
• Disproportionate funding for defence activities;
• Deteriorating arms and ammunition stored at an excessive number
of inappropriate locations; and
• Poor conditions of service for the full-time and conscript
components of the Armed Forces.xxii
The main themes in the system’s weakness was that authority over the military was
unclear and not sufficiently rested in the State; the size of the military and the defense
budget was far too big, largely because of conscription; and certain politico-military
dilemmas that kept the military from being a democratic institution in line with EuroAtlantic standards.
To address all such issues, the Defense Reform Commission proposed
legislative recommendations in 2003 that were considered in creating the 2003 Law
on Defense.
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DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES
The DRC and the 2003 Law on Defense addressed all these points, but the
most dramatic changes had to come in the democratic control of the armed forces.
With the two armies answering to different chains of command and no central civilian
or civilian body controlling both armies, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have no hope
of becoming a PfP member state.
But what is democratic control? George Katsirdakis, Deputy Director of the
Defense Partnership and Co-operative Directorate of NATO, explains democratic
control and the necessity for it: “In an organized society where we have elected
members that govern the country, obviously those elected members of the society
must be able to control the various elements of that society, because they act on behalf
of the people.”xxiii Democratic principles tell us that society should have its say in
controlling those institutions that act on society’s behalf. Therefore society should
have a say in controlling defense and military institutions that are part of society and
work on behalf of that society’s security. In a democratic structure, this theory
translates to resting control in democratically elected persons or bodies, including the
executive and legislative, parliamentary bodies.
Part of democratic control is the necessity for civilian control, which became
an important factor in creating a plan for defense reform. Active members of the
military may have expert knowledge of military matters but are bound by certain
duties that would prevent them from properly representing constituents, representation
which, as described above, is a the key reason behind establishing democratic control
of armed forces.
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2003 LAW ON DEFENSE
To achieve civilian democratic control, the Law had to clearly define the
military chain of command and to make sure the highest levels of authority in the
military were not active-duty military personnel. In other words, for an army to be
under civilian control, the chain of command must begin within the government,
rather than with high-ranking military officials.xxiv
However, it was clear from the start that Bosnia and Herzegovina did not meet
Euro-Atlantic standards for democratic or civilian control. The DRC’s report stated:
Effective democratic parliamentary control and oversight of defence in
Bosnia and Herzegovina…has been lacking in several important
respects…Several issues related to democratic parliamentary oversight
must be addressed as Bosnia and Herzegovina prepares its candidacy
for NATO’s PfP programme.xxv
With these and other shortcomings in the armed forces in BiH in mind and using the
NATO PfP requirements as a guide, the Defense Reform Commission went to work
analyzing in detail the state of the armed forces and the changes that should be made
to bring BiH closer to PfP membership. In September 2003, the Defense Reform
Commission announced its findings in “The Path to Partnership for Peace,” a
document identifying the shortcomings of the then-current military structure and
outlining the plan for its reform. With this information in hand, the BiH Parliamentary
Assembly compiled and passed the Law on Defense, which passed in the House of
Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly on 1 December 2003.xxvi
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COMMAND AND CONTROL
Ministry of Defense
Primarily, the Law reshaped the command structure and defined the powers therein.
The Law did not do away with the entity ministries of defense but rather legislated on
the creation of a state ministry of defense that would have power over the entity
ministries. Figure 1 shows the command structure as outlined in the 2003 Law.
FIGURE 1

xxvii

Command and organizational structure of defense in BiH according to the
2003 Law on Defense
BiH Presidency
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BiH Ministry of Defense
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Federation BiH Army

Army of the
Republika Srpska

The Law also described the duties and authority of the commanding civilian
positions and bodies including the Presidency, the state Ministry and Minster of
Defense, the Joint Staff, the Operational Command, the Standing Committee on
Military Matters, the Parliamentary Assembly, and the entity parliaments.xxviii
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The creation of the state Ministry of Defense was a great step toward unifying
the control of the army, which was of course the goal. Before the law passed, the
highest levels of operational command were the entity ministries of defense, which
were not legally or practically united.
However, while the BiH Presidency and the state Ministry of Defense had
authority over both entity ministries, the entity ministries did retain certain powers:
“The 2003 Law on Defense defined two chains of command: operational and
administrative chains of command. The entity ministries of defense were only granted
responsibilities within the administrative chain of command.”xxix The operational,
therefore, fell to the BiH Ministry of Defense, and the Joint Staff and Operational
Command.

Parliamentary Assembly
The Parliamentary Assembly should be a major player in democratic control
as it is a large body of democratically elected officials. The Law gave the PA the
authority to declare war or a state of emergency, to confirm nominees for positions in
the military chain of command, to conduct appropriate investigations and make rules
on the keeping of necessary secrets during such investigations.
The PA gained primary control over parliamentary matters regarding the
AFBiH. The entity parliaments were not exempt from passing legislation regarding
the AFBiH, but the PA had primary jurisdiction:
Article 36: The Parliamentary Assembly shall have primary authority
to legislate all matters related to the organisation, funding, manning,
training, equipping, deploying and employing of the Armed Forces of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.xxx
To reiterate, this statement does not exclude participation from entity parliaments.
Entity parliaments are permitted to legislate on matters of the AFBiH when the PA
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has not passed legislation one way or another. However, should contradictions in state
and entity law arise, the state law is the final word, made clear in Article 35:
The Parliamentary Assembly shall exercise democratic parliamentary
control over the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all
State-level defence institutions.xxxi
This statement is ambiguous because “democratic parliamentary control” can be
interpreted in any number of ways. However, it is clear here that whatever this
democratic parliamentary control is, the PA’s control is paramount compared to the
control of entity parliaments.
The purpose of these two articles (35 and 36) is to stress both the primacy of
state law in military matters and to explicitly define the PA’s role in contributing to
the command and control of the AFBiH.
The Law has the same intentions when it goes on to state the PA’s role in
overseeing military matters:
Article 38: The Parliamentary Assembly shall have primary authority
to oversee and investigate all matters related to the organisation,
funding, manning, training, equipping, deploying and employing of the
Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.xxxii
The PA here is granted the “primary authority,” to supervise the running of the
military and therefore the handling of its reform. However, the Law announces the
authority to act, not the capacity or will to do so. But for now, let me say simply that
as written in the 2003 Law on Defense, the PA has the authority, the power, the
jurisdiction, and most importantly the responsibility to oversee matters related to the
military. Its capacity to fulfill this responsibility will be addressed in a later section.

Summary
So with this Law, the entity armies remained but were partially run by a
central command that had control over both armies. The entities still participated in
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administrative

tasks

(i.e.

“funding,

organizing,

training,

manning,

and

equipping”xxxiii), but the final authority rested in the State. State institutions also had
the authority to command operations, and to initiate and carry out the reform process.
The state control had some measure of balance between the Presidency and the
Parliamentary Assembly, as the PA could legislate on and oversee military matters,
but the Presidency and the Ministry of Defense had the power to enforce the
legislation and report to the Parliament on those matters that the PA oversaw.
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DEFENSE REFORM COMMISSION 2005 REPORT
As previously described, in response to the High Representative’s December
2004 extension of the Defense Reform Commission’s mandate, the DRC addressed
specific issues in the military and in the reform and proposed further legislation to
adjust the reform process accordingly.
The Report was the combined work of all official representatives of the DRC,
which included the BiH, FBiH, and RS Ministers of Defense, the chair and deputy
chairs of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly Joint Committee on Security and Defense
Policy, the Chief of BiH Joint Staff, three high-ranking representatives from NATO
Headquarters in Sarajevo, the OSCE Director of Security Co-operation, the EU Force
Commander, the Senior Deputy High Representative (OHR), and a member of the EU
Presidency. There were also observers from various nationalities and professional
backgrounds including representatives of certain embassies and from NGOs focused
on defense and security issues. These observers did not have a vote in the DRC, but
they could contribute in various other aspects of the Commission’s work.xxxiv
Because the 2005 Report posed specific recommendations on legislative
measures, the chair and deputy chairs of the Parliamentary Assembly’s Joint
Committee on Defense and Security (herein: Joint Committee)6 were active members
of the DRC with both a voice and a vote in the Commission’s work. In addition, the
Joint Committee, which is made up of members of both the House of Representatives
and the House of People, thoroughly discussed all legislative measures proposed by
the DRC before the report was released. Mr. Željko Grubešić, the Parliamentary
6

The Joint Committee on Defense and Security is not the only parliamentary
committee that is made of members from both the House of Representatives and the
House of Peoples (Christian Haupt, interview with the author). However, as the other
joint committees in the Parliamentary Assembly are not referenced in this work,
“Joint Committee” will always be used in reference to the Joint Committee on
Security and Defense.
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Assembly’s Expert-Advisor for Defense and Security Matters who works closely
with the Joint Committee, discussed his view of the role of the Joint Committee in the
work of the DRC in 2005:
MPs from the Joint Committee supported strongly activity of
DRC…[The Joint Committee] discuss about defense role and
legislative role half of year. We discuss about all articles…We make
the defense law and the service law in correspondence with NATO
standards…And at the end of 2005, we finish the defense law and the
service law in our committee. And after that the House of
Representatives and the House of People concurred all proposal of our
committee.xxxv
By welcoming the opinions of members of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Defense
Reform Commission contributed to building the capacity of the Parliamentary
Assembly to legislate on matters of defense and also made sure that the elected
officials of the government of BiH had a say in the proposal, making the DRC’s work
more democratic and ensuring that its recommendations would be taken seriously by
MPs. And by making the process more democratic and inviting the BiH government
to take ownership over the reforms, the government was more likely to put its power
behind implementing such reforms after creating them on paper.

LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
The Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report (herein: the Report)
recommended sweeping amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense and proposed a
new law, the Law on Service in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both
laws were meant to create a unified system for operations and personnel within the
AFBiH. The Report also made entity-level legislative recommendations in order to
adjust entity laws to meet the new structure and especially to address matters in the
suggested amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense such as the termination of entity
ministries of defense.
28

Chain of Command
First and foremost, the 2005 recommendations for amendments to the 2003
Law on Defense got rid of the entity ministries of defense entirely, making it clear
that the State of BiH had supreme control over the AFBiH and that there was a united
command structure. As shown above in Figure 1, the 2003 Law on Defense allowed
the two armies to stay separate, though the State Ministry of Defense (MoD) had
authority over both. However, the Entity Ministries of Defense also had authority over
each army, and while the MoD had control over the entity ministries, political tension
and confusion was a likely and risky factor.
Therefore, the new chain of command meant that the entity ministries would
be closed entirely, and the power those ministries previously enjoyed would go to the
State Ministry of Defense, which was under the direct command of the Presidency.
Therefore the Army of the Federation of BiH (VF) and the Army of the Republika
Srpska (VRS) would be answering to the same people. These changes of course
would not alone unite the armies, but without this unified chain of command, there
was little to no hope of uniting the armies themselves, armies that had been answering
to separate authorities.

Regimental System
In order to bring the VF and the VRS into one army while still “maintaining
military heritage and identity,”xxxvi the DRC adopted a regimental system. The
Commission proposed that there be three regiments representing the three armies that
had existed in practice (the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Croat Defense Council Forces, and the Army of Republika Srpska). These regiments
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would be in charge of offering “direction and advice on all issues related to
ceremonial, custom, heritage and national or historic events. It is critical to understand
that a regiment has no operational status and does not issue operational orders.”xxxvii
Regiments would be quite limited in their ability to command troops.
The regiments’ staff would be fairly small in number, but the battalions would
be divided according to the regiments to which the soldiers answered. Some battalions
would answer to the regiment representing the historical Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, some battalions to the regiment of the historical Croat
Defense Council, and some battalions to the regiment of the historical VRS.
When new recruits complete training and join the AFBiH, they may request to
which regiment they want to answer. If their top request cannot be granted, they are
allowed to postpone their joining or choose not to join at all. As the DRC wrote, “no
individual will ever be forced to join a regiment not of their choice.”xxxviii
Of course, to reiterate, when a solider or battalion answers to a regiment, the
regiment is not supposed to be issuing operational commands but rather maintaining
all things ceremonial.
While the historical is important, the outcome of the final structure appears
simply to be a way to allow ethnic divisions to remain even within a so-called unified
army. The DRC argues that such a situation is important due to the new and changing
international defense and security landscape:
The security challenges of the 21st century require highly professional,
skilled soldiers who can operate in the confusing environment of
today’s conflicts. This places a premium on unit cohesion and morale.
For this reason, the Defence Reform Commission supports the
conversion of the entity armies into three infantry regiments.xxxix
With PfP and eventually NATO membership remaining the major driving force
behind the reforms, the decision landed on forming an army that could quickly
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become skilled enough to enter combat alone or in a multi-national campaign. Fully
integrating these infantry battalions into cohesive and cooperative groups ready for
modern conflicts and possibly multi-national operations would likely take
significantly longer than creating the same cooperative groups without full
integration. Cooperation takes time. Teamwork is easier when the team is made of
friends. So the DRC went with the regimental system because regiments “provide the
basis for esprit de corps, morale and unit cohesion by preserving and developing
military heritage and identity.”xl

Brigade Structure
The way the AFBiH would have any semblance of unity would be if these
battalions that answer to regiments for all things ceremonial answered to a unified
command for all things operational. For this unified command, the DRC proposed a
brigade structure similar to that used in most NATO member states. This structure
would take shape in the AFBiH with three brigades each with three battalions under
its command. In each brigade, the three battalions would each represent three different
regimental groups and therefore essentially three nationalities. The brigades would
answer to the unified, state-level chain of command. Figure 2 reflects the chain of
command and the ethnic breakdown of the battalions.xli
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Parliamentary Assembly
The section on the power and responsibilities of the Parliamentary Assembly
remained largely unchanged from the 2003 Law on Defense. However, the DRC
recommended that this particular section be moved closer to the beginning of the law
before the discussion of the roles of other branches of government and high-ranking
positions in the chain of command. The DRC moved the section in this way “to
reflect the importance of the constitutional position of the Parliamentary
Assembly.”xlii

Other Structural Reforms
The Report outlines all the specific duties of the positions and offices in the
chain of command, some of which remained the same as in the 2003 law, some that
was added or changed, especially in the case of the Ministry of Defense as it absorbed
all duties of the former entity ministries of defense. For the purposes of this research,
these changes are not particularly relevant, so I will not describe them in detail here.
Nor will I go into the other piece of legislation, the Law on Service in the Armed
Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is included in the Report, because it lacks
relevance to the research question.
The Report includes recommendations on entity-level legislation regarding the
reform, which deals with various legal adjustments that would need to take effect
should the aforementioned legislation pass in the Parliamentary Assembly, most
notably the removal of mentions of and budgets for entity-level ministries of defense.
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The Report also outlines a general timeline for the transfer of functions and
the general implementation of these new measures. This timeline begins 1 January
2006 and ends 31 December 2007.

Professionalization of the AFBiH
Aside

from

structural

reforms,

the

DRC

recommended

complete

professionalization of the AFBiH. In the 2003 reforms, the DRC recommended
significant reductions in the amount of conscripts and in the length of their contracts.
However, in the 2005 reforms, the DRC suggested the elimination of all conscription:
The new Law on Defence embraces the concept of professional armed
forces
and
the
process
of
professionalisation
and
modernisation…[T]he Defence Reform Commission has agreed to
eliminate conscription in order to facilitate the development of armed
forces and defence structures that are truly professional.xliii
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have the need for conscription especially after the
huge push to downsize the military since the reforms began. Nor can BiH afford to
maintain a conscript army. Therefore, the recommendations and law supported the
elimination of the conscript system and outlined how to create a professional army.

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY VOTES ON THE REFORMS
The DRC submitted the Report in September 2005, and in October 2005 both
the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives that make up the
Parliamentary Assembly voted on the amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense7 and
on the Law on Service in the AFBiH. Both laws passed on 5 October 2005.xliv Aside
7

The amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense changed more than fifty percent of the
original law, which according to the Unified Rules for Legislative Drafting in the
Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005) requires the creation of a new law.
Therefore, the amendments to the 2003 Law on Defense dismissed the 2003 law and
replaced it with the “Law on Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (DRC 2005
Report, 41)
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from a few minor changes that are not relevant to this research, the laws passed
exactly as they were presented in the Report. The Joint Committee and the PA as a
whole did spend some time debating the reform legislation, but the MPs’ involvement
in the DRC and in drafting the legislation within the Report helped speed the process
along. When voting on the Law on Defense that October, only one member of each
house in the Parliamentary Assembly voted against the law.xlv
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PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

The general agreement in democratic theory is that there exists a need for a
legislative body to oversee the implementation of the legislation it passes, to hold
responsible those who are in charge of such implementation. The Euro-Atlantic
community certainly accepts this theory. The DRC wrote in 2003 that “civilian
democratic control and oversight of the military is a central organising principle in
states with methods of governance consistent with Euro-Atlantic practices.”xlvi
As discussed above, NATO, which Bosnia and Herzegovina aims to join one
day, expects that member countries have proper civilian democratic oversight of their
militaries. George Katsirdakis, the Deputy Director of the Defense Partnership and
Cooperative Directorate within NATO, spoke of his belief in the importance of
parliamentary control of armed forces regardless of the supervision or effective
implementation of laws in other branches of government:
The parliament has, and should have, one of the most important roles
in controlling the armed forces. The reason because although the
President and the government may represent of course elected
representatives of the state, they do not always represent all the
tendencies in the political spectrum, which is the case in the case of
parliament – because parliament is much more representative of the
people than obviously the government can be. The government
represents only the leading element of political opinion at a certain
point in time, but what about the other elements? So that is why
parliament has such an important role in democratic control.xlvii
What I believe Mr. Katsirdakis was getting at here was that because they are larger
bodies of government than the executive and have many more members representing
more concentrated groups of citizens and also are usually up for election more
frequently than executives, parliaments are more representative of people and
tendencies in the political sphere. With this in mind, parliaments should have a
significant amount of control of armed forces to keep that control as representative of
society’s expectations for the armed forces.
Of course, Mr. Katsirdakis left out another key reason for parliamentary control
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of the armed forces: the parliament should serve as a check on both the active military
and on the civilians in government who serve in the highest positions in the military
chain of command, namely the president(s) and the executive-controlled ministry of
defense.
With all this in mind and knowing that NATO expects member states to have
proper democratic representation as well as a balance of powers in controlling the
armed forces, leaders in BiH and in the DRC understood that the reform would have
to address the Parliamentary Assembly’s inability to effectively oversee the military.
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PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY’S CAPACITY BEFORE 2003 REFORMS
First we must look at why the Parliamentary Assembly did not have the ability
to effectively oversee the military. The first reason is the result of a yet incomplete
process of transition from socialism to democracy. Under the Yugoslav socialist
system, questioning of military matters was not encouraged and sometimes not even
tolerated. In addition, the role of a legislative body was minimal; no political tradition
existed to promote Parliamentary criticism of the executive or the Communist Party.
The other reason for the Parliamentary Assembly’s lack of sufficient and
effective oversight was that it did not have complete power in this field but rather
shared many of the duties of parliamentary control with the entity parliaments, which
oversaw their own armies. For example, in the Federation of BiH, the entity
parliament had the authority to act on certain key matters of defense: “Based on the
Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the entity Parliamentary
Assembly has two main powers within the sphere of defence: authorising the use of
military force by the entity and financing the armed forces of the entity.”xlviii
This lack of power kept the PA from being able to effectively oversee military
matters as it did not have the power to gain sufficient information on the military or to
properly react should something go wrong within the military. If a parliament does
not like what it sees in the matters it supervises, then it should have the power to react
in a way that effects change. Such powers often come with the authority to hold
hearings, refuse approval of the executive’s nominees, or withhold requested budgets.
However, the DRC notes that before the military reform in BiH, the PA had
“difficulties in securing information or the participation of government officials in
parliamentary hearings, the lack of effective budget controls and oversight of defence
expenditures, and underdeveloped relationships between defence institutions and
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parliamentary committees,”xlix all of which limited its capacity to effect change or
even to properly observe where change was needed.
The first most practical capacity gap in the PA was the lack of a committee for
overseeing military, defense, or security matters. Prior to the release of DRC’s 2003
report, “The Path to the Partnership for Peace,” committees in the state Parliamentary
Assembly “recommended the establishment of a Joint Committee for Security Policy
and Oversight and Control over the Agency for Information and Protection of Bosnia
and Herzegovina,”l having recognized on their own the need for such a committee.
The DRC upheld this recommendation, and the PA created the Joint Committee for
Defense and Security Policy and Monitoring of the Work of Defense and Security
Structures on the BiH Level, also known as the Joint Committee on Defense and
Security.
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CAPACITY-BUILDING IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
Since the country’s leaders’ almost universal decision to go ahead with
defense reform in 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly’s capacity to oversee the
military and its transformation has grown immensely.
Chilean Senator and President of the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary
Union, Sergio Páez Verdugo, laid out the general necessities for parliamentary
oversight of the security sector:
Parliament is responsible for setting the legal parameters, adopting the
budget, and overseeing security activities. It can only exercise these
responsibilities in full if it has broad access to information, the
necessary technical expertise, and the power and intention to hold the
government to account.li
We will use these two lists as a starting point for assessing the efficacy of the
measures the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH has taken to strengthen its capacity to
successfully implement democratic civilian control of the armed forces. Does the PA
have broad access to information, technical expertise, and the will to hold the
government accountable? And with these tools has it set legal parameters, adopted the
budget, and overseen security activities?

TOOLS FOR PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
Broad Access to Information:
Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense has proven to be fairly cooperative in sharing
information with the PA, both through the aforementioned workshops and through
regular reporting to the Joint Committee on the transition process. Mr. Haupt said, “In
most cases the Minister of Defense has provided information that was requested [by]
the Parliament…[But i]n some cases the Ministry of Defense is avoiding to provide
the answers, or they’re very slow, or the answers are very short.”lii However, the
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general attitude is that the Ministry is fairly cooperative when the Parliamentary
Assembly requests information.
As Mr. Haupt pointed out, some lack of information sharing comes from an
unwillingness on the side of the Ministry, but some is also the fault of the
Parliamentary Assembly itself. “There are many events,” said Mr. Haupt, “where we
[in the international community] would probably…expect the Parliament to run an
investigation or to ask for more materials, and [the MPs] are not doing it.”liii
There are a host of reasons why the MPs don’t always request further
information when they should, but a large factor and one that needs significant
attention to remedy, is the country’s political tradition. The Communist system of
which Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part when it was a republic within Yugoslavia,
did not encourage citizens or government institutions to ask too many questions,
especially not when it came to military and security matters: “In connection with this
old bad tradition that with security matters you’re not allowed or you’re not supposed
to ask questions. This was the past system.”liv And it seems the legacy remains,
though it is slowly changing. Mr. Haupt for one remains hopeful, saying, “I think
there is more and more a feeling among Parliamentarians that they are not satisfied
with implementation, for example with defense reform, and they are willing to take
this forward now.”lv Having worked closely with the Joint Committee for many years,
Mr. Haupt is confident that the committee members are now, much more than before,
willing to question the Minister: “If you compare now to three years ago when the
Committee [on Defense and Security] was established, now the members of
Committee know much more than before about all these matters.”lvi
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Inter-Institutional Cooperation
Do not let go unnoticed the amount of cooperation the PA has used in carrying
out all of these projects, especially its cooperation with the Ministry of Defense. The
workshops were often coordinated with the MoD, which allows both the PA and the
MoD to share information and expertise as well as to foster a good and steady
relationship between the two institutions.
A handbook written by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)8 notes the
importance of parliaments having strong and friendly relationships with other
institutions: “Not all behaviour and interaction can be regulated by law…[I]nforming
and involving parliamentarians fully…is not only a matter of transparency and legal
accountability, but of dialogue between people too.”lvii A cooperative relationship
between the PA and the MoD is key at this juncture, because synergism will help
strengthen the capacities of both institutions and therefore strengthen the civilian and
democratic oversight of the military. Cooperation will also hopefully ensure that the
MoD respects the requests of the PA in terms of both information sharing and
recommendations for change. Each institution can learn a lot from the other.

Suggestions
As Mr. Haupt mentioned above, the Parliament does not always push the
Ministry or other institutions for all the information it needs. In the face of resistance
from other institutions, the PA has proven to back down fairly easily. Therefore, the

8

“The IPU is the international organization of Parliaments of sovereign States”
(www.ipu.org). It serves to connect parliaments throughout the world to coordinate
and share experiences to improve the workings of parliaments to solve both global
and domestic issues.
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MPs need to make sure to ask pertinent questions when receiving reports and must
also pursue further information where questions remain. Mr. Haupt said:
What we have to ensure is that [Parliamentarians] build up an
awareness that they have to scrutinize, that they have to be critical, that
it is in their interest to be critical and not just to please the Minister [of
Defense]. So if something goes wrong, they have to ask the difficult
questions, they have to demand the full implementation…because in
the end it is to the benefit of the Parliamentarians.lviii
In addition, while the PA has been quite successful in ensuring a typically
friendly relationship with the Ministry of Defense, it should not forget that the
Ministry need not be the only source of information. The PA should work on creating
stronger relationships with other government institutions, international and
intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs, all of which can be helpful in providing
information.

Technical Expertise
One of the greatest obstacles in securing parliamentary oversight of the
military in BiH is that many MPs lack of sufficient knowledge of military matters,
especially as they related to politics. Stela Vasić of the Center for Security Studies, a
Bosnian NGO, said, “You know it’s strange when you come to make a workshop to
the Parliamentarians and talk about the role of NATO, and they are like completely––
asking some silly questions.”lix MPs come from many different backgrounds and
therefore do not always have a clear understanding of what it means to oversee the
military or how to do that, how to create a useful budget, or what questions would be
most relevant during progress-report briefings from the Ministry of Defense.
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Workshops
However, here too Parliament has made great strides in increasing the MPs’
politico-military fluency. The MPs on the Joint Committee often attend workshops to
learn about specific elements of the military and of their duties with regard to military
matters. For example, Mr. Grubešić described some of the workshops he prepared for
the MPs: “Every month we have one day for education for MPs. For example, I
prepared presentation – I cooperate with a representative of MoD – I presented
structure of Ministry of Defense, of Joint Staff, and I presented activity of MoD.”lx
The Minister of Defense often attends these workshops to be available for MPs’
questions so they may hear the most accurate answers.
Workshops like these are especially important after elections when new MPs
begin their work. Therefore this sort of work should be ongoing, and there is every
indication that it will be, provided funding remains, an issue discussed in full below.
Educational workshops are not limited, though, to the MPs on the Joint
Committee. The Center for Security Studies holds workshops to which all MPs are
invited. It is important that all MPs have at least a basic knowledge of military
matters, because it is they who will have to debate and vote on relevant legislation
and appoint certain high-ranking military personnel. Ms. Vasić said that most MPs are
eager and willing to attend these workshops and to learn what they can about defense
and security matters. She also praised in particular the Joint Committee’s work in this
area: “They are very good. We have very good relations with them. Whatever we
organize, they were helpful.”lxi

Travel
In addition to the workshops, and actually to strengthen the depth and quality
of such workshops, some MPs and Parliamentary Assembly staffers such as Mr.
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Grubešić have been present on various trips to other European parliaments and
organizations focused on defense and security matters to learn more about
parliamentary oversight of defense and security:
We organize cooperation with other countries in Southeast Europe. We
visited Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Switzerland, Belgium, Slovakia, Lithuania, and we visited Council of
Europe, Secretariat of OSCE Mission in Vienna, NATO Headquarters
in Brussels. And also we invited our colleagues from Croatia, from
Slovenia, from Germany, from France, from Estonia…the main goal of
this activity was exchanging experience regarding parliamentary
oversight…and during our visit to all country in the region, we visited
ministry of defense…and speaker of the parliament.lxii
It is clear that the Joint Committee and the Parliamentary Assembly as a whole are
working constantly to find the most effective way to oversee the military and to be
up-to-date on the reforms.
The Joint Committee’s educational workshops, cooperation with NGOs in
providing further workshops, and visits to other European nations and organizations
for security have gone a long way toward providing the MPs with more knowledge of
the issues, allowing them to be more effective in carrying out their work.

Suggestions
These activities should continue every year, because education is always an
ongoing process. Current MPs can build on what they already know, and after every
election, new MPs will need to catch up.
My main concern is that many of these extremely helpful and important site
visits are not funded by the BiH government but by the international community. For
example, the visits to various European nations as discussed above were funded

46

almost entirely by NATO’s Tailored Cooperation Program (TCP)9 in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.lxiii While outside funding itself is not a significant issue right now,
problems will arise if and when such funds are withdrawn as the international
community pulls out of BiH. The PA should look into its own budget to find ways to
support its projects for oversight, or it should look for ways to secure smaller amounts
of funding from various donors. It could also explore ways to ensure the repayment of
loans so that it can securely take out loans to continue to increase its capacity for
these important activities.
However, as discussed in full below, the Parliamentary Assembly often cannot
make necessary budget adjustment due to the tardiness of ministries’ budget
proposals. Therefore the ministries should take steps to remedy this situation, and the
international community should put pressure on the ministries to do so.
If these parties do not take it upon themselves to take action in this case, the
Parliamentary Committee has a few other options. The first is that if no changes occur
in the international community’s or the MoD’s actions, the PA should push for an
inquiry or hearing on the matter or find a menacing political threat to get the
ministries to produce on-time budgets. This political threat should be the PA’s
decision to block certain legislation that the government or the particular ministry or
ministries that have turned in late budget requests want or need passed. Such action
should not only solve or improve certain budget issues but also prove to the country
that the Parliamentary Assembly is willing to assert itself to ensure proper
implementation of the laws.

9

The Tailored Cooperation Program (or Process) is a program that allows TCP
participant countries to take steps toward being involved in the Partnership for Peace.
Each country’s TCP is different depending on what it can offer to PfP and what PfP
can offer it. TCP participants are included in some Partnership for Peace activities.
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The second option is to look for other ways to gain the same or similar
politico-military fluency on a smaller budget. For example, while some may need
convincing, international parliamentarians may accept invitations to visit the PA in
BiH, therefore allowing the same resource-sharing as Bosnian MPs received on visits
to other European nations but with far fewer expenses.
While the latter strategy is not ideal, the former being more beneficial to the
PA and its reputation in the political scene, its relative merits are worth considering,
especially in a nation where the budget is exceptionally tight, and less-expensive,
equally-effective alternatives are worth exploring.

Will to Hold the Government Accountable
This area is trickier to measure, so let us first look at it in reverse. What
political elements decrease political will, and how have these elements affected the
PA in BiH? The DCAF and IPO handbook lists the three most common factors in
decreasing political will: party discipline, constituency interest (or lack thereof), and
security concerns/confidentiality.lxiv

Decreasing Political Will:
Party Discipline
Party discipline, the document argues, often makes parliamentarians wary of
criticizing the executive if (s)he is of the same party.lxv The situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is unique in that there are three presidents that represent the country’s
three major constituencies. Therefore, the executive branch is always open to a broad
range of criticism, because every party responds to at least two presidents not of one’s
own. Therefore, this concern, while not void in BiH, is of lesser importance in
hindrance of political will.
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Constituency Interest
Constituency interest, which the document interprets as typically society’s
lack of interest in security matters, means that parliamentarians are less likely to
pursue issues of security if voters are not interested because “many parliamentarians
think that it does not pay, in terms of being re-elected, to spend too much of their time
on security issues.”lxvi Again, this case does not carry much weight in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, because defense and security issues have great relevance to the lives of
constituents and are often widely discussed in the media. In addition, membership in
Euro-Atlantic organizations such as NATO does indeed pay off in terms of being reelected. Advancement towards membership goals can go along way in re-election
campaigns, and therefore investing time in security and defense matters should be an
important consideration in campaign strategy. I have seen no evidence that
parliamentarians have been less willing to act due to a belief that constituents are not
interested.

Security Considerations
The final factor in decreasing political will is “security considerations forcing
parliamentarians not to disclose their findings.”lxvii For obvious reasons, information
on the impact of secrecy is not readily available. However, with the international
community currently playing a large and active role in the military of BiH, it seems
that if the PA knows certain secrets, the international intergovernmental organizations
such as NATO, OSCE, and EUFOR probably do too. Therefore it is not up to the
parliamentarians to keep that information confidential or even to be the sole bearers of
investigation.
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Political Tradition
Senator Verdugo did not mention political tradition as a reason for a decrease
in political will, but it is an especially important aspect in countries of transition,
especially post-socialist transition. Political tradition in socialist states tends, as it did
in Yugoslavia, to limit questioning of the Communist Party or the country’s leader.
Questioning of the Executive, the Communist Party, or the military was not
encouraged, creating a political tradition that amounts to an unwillingness to hold the
administration or the military accountable for implementing laws such as the defense
reform laws in BiH. While this tradition seems to be slowly changing as the country
adapts to a democratic system, the country’s history in this case still plays a role in
detracting from political will.

Proving Political Will
Having essentially negated the factors that detract from political will, let us
look at the PA’s actions that reveal its will. First of all, the Joint Committee has
proven to be one of the strongest committees in Parliament:
The Defense Security Committee in the State Parliament has a general
feeling that it is probably the best committee in the State Parliament,
so…the members are proud to be a member of this committee, which
automatically results in a more proactive approach.lxviii
The drive in the committee can be seen in all the efforts the MPs and Parliamentary
staff have made to gain more knowledge of defense issues, namely site visits and
educational workshops, and to create strong and friendly relationships with other
institutions. They have cooperated with both international and domestic organizations
and institutions to create mechanisms for proper oversight, such as the creation of the
Joint Committee for Defense and Security and the frequent holding of informational
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meetings and visits with players in the politico-military scene. All this reveals a
strong will to address security issues and to improve the PA’s ability to do so.

Suggestions
However, the PA must also be ready and willing to take action to bring about
change. Of course, with the defense reform’s progress thus far, the PA seems not to
have many complaints or is unwilling to cause controversy that could undermine the
progress of reform. Both reasons are logical and worth consideration. But in time, the
PA will have to prove the reasoning behind its supervision: to hold the government
accountable. All government institutions have room for improvement, just as the PA
does, and it is the PA’s job to help those institutions progress.
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EFFECTIVE USE OF TOOLS FOR PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
With a generally positive assessment of the general tools Senator Verdugo
listed, we must then look at how the PA has used these tools to properly carry out its
duties as a legislative body. Let us focus for the purposes of this research on just the
AFBiH and directly related matters and reforms. In other words, I shall not address
the PA’s role in internal security matters such as police reform and border security.

Legal Parameters
The PA passed two rounds of laws for reforming the structure of the military
in BiH, first in 2003 and then again in 2005. It created the Joint Committee on
Security and Defense and through legislation properly addressed its duties with
respect to the military and the transition process. The Committee oversaw the
implementation of the 2003 Law on Defense and was quite involved in reviewing and
adopting DRC’s drafts of the 2005 legislation. The then-Chairman and Deputy
Chairmen of the Joint Committee served as ex officio members on the Defense
Reform Commission as it confronted the second round of major reforms in 2005. Dr.
Raffi Gregorian, the former Co-Chair of the Defense Reform Commission, said that it
was “very very useful to have them there, because the expectation was that they
would be our interlocutors in Parliament, to keep them [MPs] informed as to what
was going on and also give us their expert advice on how to deal with certain issues in
parliamentary procedure.”lxix
While the DRC was coming up with a plan for further legislative reforms,
some MPs visited various defense institutions in BiH to ask personnel what they
wanted and expected from the reforms. Mr. Grubešić, the PA’s Expert-Advisor for
Defense and Security, said, “Our MPs discussed with soldiers, with officers, with
generals. What is their suggestion? What they want…to include in Defense Law and
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Service Law? And the result was excellent.”lxx This was a true show of a democratic
system: representatives directly asking constituents about reforms that would have a
direct impact on these citizens’ lives and jobs. And without the support of these
members of the military, implementation of reform may have been much more
problematic.
After the DRC released its 2005 Report with recommendations on legislative
changes, the Joint Committee discussed the laws and made a few minor changes
before overseeing the presentation of the laws to the rest of the Parliamentary
Assembly for ratification.
Do not underplay the Committee’s success in this area. The creation of a
single, unified military was a sensitive topic, and frankly one not required for PfP
membership, as NATO did not specifically require a fully integrated army. Many
Bosnians and Parliamentarians alike did not approve of the armies’ unification in this
way, but the members of the Joint Committee helped push through the reforms. Dr.
Gregorian, who worked closely with the Joint Committee in getting the 2005 reforms
passed into law, remarked on the great efforts Committee members put in to creating
a successful reform package, recognizing “the good will that [MPs] had towards
trying to make [the 2005 defense reforms] happen even though in some cases
members of the committee did things and adopted positions that they knew were
contrary to what their party wanted them to do. A lot of courage demonstrated
there.”lxxi
These legislative achievements were no small feat. Reforming any military is
typically fraught with political danger. The reform in BiH in particular, the idea of
uniting the two armies, was an extremely sensitive topic. Once deciding to go ahead
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with the reforms, reaching consensus presented another formidable foe. But the MPs
rose above the fray and reached nearly unprecedented parliamentary consensus.

Suggestions
Legislation should not remain forever stagnant. Minor changes could be made
to make smoother the transition process and the everyday running of the military. Dr.
Gregorian suggested that the MoD might run more smoothly and be more efficient if
it had one Deputy Minister instead of two. In addition, the power to remove general
rank officers rests in the Presidency rather than with the Minister of Defense. The
Presidency, however, rarely achieves consensus on matters such as this, therefore
effectively barring the possibility of removing generals from the military who fall
below standards.lxxii These difficulties might be changed through legislation, and the
PA should address such issues and look to see if there are other areas in the military
that would function more efficiently with certain legislative changes.
However, I recognize that the recent legislative changes regarding military
matters have been drastic and may need more time to settle before jumping into new
changes.
All in all, the legislative achievements in the PA have been extraordinary and
have gone a long way to helping the country achieve successful reform. Writing
effective legislation requires a firm understanding of the situation at hand, which can
be gained through both access to information and expertise, as Senator Verdugo
suggested.

Passing legislation requires the political will to push for consensus.

Considering the success of the reform legislation and the overwhelming consensus on
a highly sensitive and divisive topic, it is clear that the PA effectively used these three
tools in dealing with defense legislation.
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Budget:
Positive Changes
An accurate and transparent budget is an incredibly arduous and yet important
task that is left largely to the control of parliaments. As budgets deal mostly (though
sometimes not solely) with taxpayers’ money, taxpayers have a right to know how the
money is being spent and therefore deserve a transparent and well-adjusted budget.
DCAF and the IPU note that “to this day, one of parliament’s most important
mechanisms for controlling the executive is the budget…As security sector
organizations use a substantial share of the state’s budget, it remains essential that
parliament monitor the use of the state’s scarce resources both effectively and
efficiently.”lxxiii
Every year the Joint Committee on Security and Defense attends a two-day
workshop on the defense budget. In cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, the
workshop leaders “presented [to attendees] structure of the budget elements and what
is necessary equipment for Army and everything.”lxxiv
This effort shows the Committee’s commitment to having a greater
understanding of the budget and into passing an adequate and yet largely reduced
budget, noting the major downsizing of the AFBiH throughout the reform process.
And the Committee’s work has been easier due to the MoD’s accurate and detailed
budget requests. No doubt the MoD’s cooperation in budget requests comes from the
mutual respect shared between institutions. Dr. Gregorian said that in “the past two
years the defense ministry has prepared a very well justified and explained budget.
It’s the only ministry in the state that does that, that actually follows the guidelines
that Parliament requires. And as a result the Parliamentary committee has always
supported their full funding request, as has the finance committee.”lxxv
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Remaining Issues
However, in recent years the Parliamentary Assembly as a whole has not
approved the defense budget requests in full, though often due to extenuating
circumstances. For example, one year the IMF and the Principal Deputy High
Representative at the time “ordered the defense budget cut by 75 million marks,”lxxvi a
decision which, for various reasons, the PA had to respect. This lack of sufficient
funding will likely slow the transition process and may make the MoD less willing to
cooperate on budget matters in the future. Therefore it is crucial that the PA address
these budget cut-backs and that the Joint Committee find ways to push the budget
through both houses or to fight last minute cutbacks by international community
leaders.
The international community of course also has a hand in these cutbacks and
in these budget issues as they arise. While the IMF surely needs to monitor the BiH
government’s spending of IMF-loan money, the IMF should try to work with the
Parliament to come to an agreement on spending. Spending time on these decisions
will serve both to increase the Parliament’s capacity to properly asses similar budget
concerns in the future and to uphold democratic principles that the IMF and HR
infringe upon when making indisputable demands. While the demands may be fully
within the law in BiH, that fact does not guarantee their democratic values.
According to Mr. Haupt, in most years the ministries deliver the budgets about
three months late: in December rather than September. In order to have the year’s
budget ready on time, the Parliamentary Assembly therefore has only one month
(until the end of January) to review, adjust, and approve the budget.10

10

The respective ministries propose budget requests (i.e. the Ministry of Defense
proposes the defense budget). The Parliamentary Assembly receives these requests,
and the relevant committee reviews the budget (i.e. the Committee on Defense and
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Because of the delay, the Parliament must pass the budget very quickly,
because a delayed budget approval can have serious repercussions in the country’s
functioning. However, passing a budget too quickly has consequences of its own: “If
you want to pass something in a hurry, it means clearly you are not able to look into
the budget lines and you are not able to change or amend,”lxxvii which, among other
negative results, leaves both the MoD with what it claims is not enough funding and
the Parliament which does not have sufficient funds to carry out its duties of
oversight.
Mr. Haupt takes issue with the fact that “nobody is in fact asking the question
whether it’s inappropriate for the government to pass the budget three months late to
the Parliament, …why [the government is] undermining the right of the Parliament to
scrutinize the budget and to intervene. But this question is not asked from the side of
the international community.”lxxviii Therefore, instead of putting all the pressure on the
Parliament to pass the budget on time, the international community should also make
a point to pressure the ministries to deliver on-time budget proposals to the
Parliament.
Of course, all of these adjustments would certainly be made easier if the
ministries took it upon themselves to deliver their budget proposals to the PA on time.
However, the Parliamentary Assembly should not sit idly by waiting for the
ministries or the international community to change. If no change can be seen, then,
as mentioned above, the PA should call an inquiry or investigation into the reasons for
the delayed ministries or should use other political tools at their disposal to pressure
the ministries into giving MPs what they need to do their jobs properly.
Security reviews the defense budget) and makes adjustments based on the
committee’s discussion. Once the adjusted budget passes in committee, it goes to a
vote in both houses of the Parliamentary Assembly, which is the last phase of
approval.
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Overseeing Security Activities
As discussed above, the Joint Committee regularly receives reports on the
MoD’s activities and has a friendly relationship with the MoD. The Minister of
Defense regularly attends meetings and briefings for the Joint Committee.lxxix
Committee members have also gone on many site visits to various security
institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They spoke with members of the Joint Staff,
with representatives from the MoD and the Minister of Defense himself, with
soldiers, officers, and generals to gain a better understanding of their work and to see
where they wanted improvements. The Joint Committee planned many such site visits
including visits to regional offices of the State Border Service. Mr. Grubešić said,
“Our committee visited about 65% of the state border. The main goal was: what is
security at the Bosnian border? And we discuss with border police, with border
guidance, with management.”lxxx
Visits such as these are extremely important in developing a close and trusting
relationship between politicians and military officials. DCAF and the IPU recommend
that parliamentarians in all countries take part in similar visits of security sector sites:
Parliamentary visits to the premises of the security services can be
regarded as a way to develop a dialogue and build trust and
understanding between political and military leaders. These visits of
parliamentarians enhance their awareness of the soldiers’ daily
problems and demonstrate to the military that the political leadership is
interested in and committed to soldiers’ mission and well-being.”lxxxi
Cooperation is always more efficient and effective than endless bickering, and visits
such as this are excellent opportunities to build cooperative relationships.
With huge amounts of information on military matters and with the broad
scope of defense and security issues and happenings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
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PA will find it impossible to know everything. However, the PA is going to great
lengths to oversee what it can about defense and security within its borders.

Suggestions
We have established that the Parliamentary Assembly’s capacity has
significantly increased since 2003. Its ability to oversee military matters, to know
what is going on in the ministry of defense and within the military has seen enormous
improvement. However, the PA is lacking in its willingness to openly and strongly
criticize the government or the implementation process.
There are several different ways the PA could go about effecting change in
this scenario including holding a hearing, blocking military appointments, or refusing
to pass the necessary budget. For various reasons including the need for continuation
of transition and reform implementation, blockades such as refusing to ratify military
appointments or pass the budget would not be an effective option for the PA at this
time. However, a hearing or the threat of one might help to speed the transfer of
property and secure a stronger position for the PA in military oversight by putting
power behind its laws and its oversight. The PA can have all the information in the
world, but if it refuses to effect change based on that information, then it has gotten
nowhere. DCAF and IPU write of the advantages of a hearing or inquiry:
With regard to security/defence issues, ad hoc committees of inquiry have a
specific importance and their advantages are numerous. In particular: [t]heir
very setting up may be viewed, by the public especially, as a positive political
signal; [t]hey may be an adequate tool for detailed scrutiny of politically
sensitive issues related to the security sector; [t]hey may allow a precise
evaluation of the government’s policy on specific security issues and propose,
where appropriate, means of redress or reorientation likely to be accepted by
the entire house and the government.lxxxii
Despite the merits of an inquiry or the like, the PA has not taken appropriate action
when necessary. When discussing the possibility of an Parliamentary inquiry or
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investigation into military matters the PA deems inappropriate or not properly
following the law, Mr. Haupt said, “If it gets tricky, [Parliamentarians] are not
prepared to go to the very end.”lxxxiii But going to the end, fully pushing the
government for information and proper implementation practices is exactly the job of
the Parliament. Mr. Haupt agreed: “Now it’s up to the Parliament to have a critical
approach and to openly criticize the ministries if something is going wrong…”lxxxiv

Example
The issue of property is an example of just such a time and place to squeeze
the government on improper implementation. The most common complaint I have
heard about the implementation of reforms is with arms control and dealing with the
exchanging and destruction of movable and immovable property as outlined in the
body of the 2005 Law on Defense. The details of that process are irrelevant in this
paper except to say that the 2005 Law on Defense made ambiguous statements
regarding the transfer of entity-owned military property that is immovable (i.e. land,
barracks) and movable (i.e. small arms, ammunition). Some argue that the property
was to be transferred from entity to state ownership in the beginning of January 2006.
However some entity officials expect the state to pay the entity governments for the
property, while others in the BiH government disagree because payment is not
mentioned in the Law. In addition, much of the weaponry was to be destroyed due to
the military downsizing. As a result of the ambiguity, some in the military and
government are blocking efforts to transfer or destroy such property.lxxxv
The Parliamentary Assembly is not directly responsible for coordinating the
efforts surrounding the property debate. However, as it is responsible for supervising
the implementation of the legislation it passed, the PA therefore has responsibility for
overseeing the transfer and/or destruction of property as written in the law. Since this
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aspect of the law is not being properly implemented, the Parliamentary Assembly has
a responsibility to act.
The lack of cooperation in arms control and property transfer presents an
opportunity for the Parliamentary Assembly to hold an inquiry and achieve these
three desired effects: the public’s positive interpretation of the inquiry, the
opportunity to discuss in public a sensitive issue on all sides, and to address how this
issue might be resolved. In addition, the international community’s frustration with
the lack of movement on the property issue would put them in the PA’s corner, giving
the PA a significant advantage and maybe the resources and power to back up their
claims of improper implementation. The PA should take full advantage of the
opportunity here to assert itself in the changing politico-military scene.

61

SUMMARY OF SUGGESTIONS
In terms of programming, effort, and the generally agreed-upon success of the
Parliamentary Assembly’s efforts at building its own capacity to oversee military
matters, I must conclude that the best way to improve is to continue on the current
trajectory, to maintain the educational programming and the efforts to get first-hand
knowledge of the country’s security situation through site visits and the like.
The PA can improve on its own knowledge of the issues and the ability for it
to receive accurate and up-to-date information concerning the military if it maintains
and improves upon its relationships with other institutions in the BiH government as
well as international and intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. To build on
these relationships, Parliamentarians and Parliamentary staff should be frequently in
touch with these organizations, should ask for information, and should continue to
invite representatives of these organizations to events in the Parliamentary Assembly,
especially ones outlining the work of the PA.
The MPs must also take it upon themselves to ask for more information from
the Ministry of Defense and other defense-related organizations. And they must take
more critical stances toward the Ministry of Defense, even going so far as establishing
and following through with an inquiry or parliamentary hearing.
Budget concerns should be at the forefront of the PA’s criticism. The
Parliamentary Assembly does not have enough funding to effectively carry out its
duties of oversight, and some claim the defense budget is insufficient for the
necessary military duties and reforms. The PA should use its political leverage to
ensure that budget proposals are delivered on time to allow the PA enough time to
make necessary adjustments that allow the PA enough time to approve a wellbalanced budget.
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THE FUTURE OF REFORM

While the defense reform in BiH has thus far been quite successful, most
would say the most successful reform since Dayton, implementation is not yet
complete, and the future is unclear.

Structure
The basic structural reforms should hopefully continue to be implemented and
show signs that they will. The next large hurdle in this scene comes with personnel
placement. All military personnel have been interviewed in recent months in the
process of deciding where personnel should be placed based on specialty and
regimental preferences. By the end of 2006 or beginning of 2007, all offered contracts
should be delivered, and then it is up to those men and women to decide if they will
accept the offered positions, though undoubtedly acceptance will for some mean
geographical changes and maybe serving in a regiment not of one’s preference. Some
difficulties may arise here, but most seem both hopeful and confident that the process
will be completed relatively on schedule and without any major delays. And from
there will begin regular day-to-day business under the new structure.
At this point, the Parliamentary Assembly should begin regular visits to all
operational and regimental bases to begin overseeing the military itself rather than
simply the implementation of legal adjustments, which most commonly translates to
overseeing the Ministry of Defense.

Partnership for Peace
On 29 November 2006, NATO invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a
member of the Partnership for Peace Program.lxxxvi Those I interviewed following the
decision were largely divided in their ideas about the impact membership will have on
the implementation of reform, though they all agree that it will have an impact. Some
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believe the membership will accelerate and improve implementation, because
politicians are motivated by the decision, having political proof that the reforms have
been successful so far and that they pay off in terms of reaching the country’s goals
for Euro-Atlantic integration. Further progress in defense reform could therefore bring
further integration, which motivates politicians to push ahead.
Others, however, are not as confident about the help membership will provide.
While High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling celebrated the invitation,
claiming it is “reward for many years of hard work and a reflection of how far the
country has come in reforming its defence structures,”lxxxvii some take a different
stand. Most in Bosnia and Herzegovina agree that the decision was largely political
and believe that while the defense reform has been successful, the invitation into PfP
may not have had so much to do with this success as for various political purposes
such as the upcoming United Nations Security Council decision on the status of the
region of Kosovo, a sensitive topic in the region. The impact of the Kosovo decision
deserves much discussion, which I will not offer because of its tangential nature to
this research.
Part of the reasoning behind believing the decision did not have much to do
with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s actual progress is lack of completion of a key PfP
requirement: cooperation with the ICTY. While “cooperation” is ambiguous, the
general agreement was that without explicitly saying so, “cooperation with the ICTY”
means capturing the two notorious indicted war criminals, Radovan Karadžić and
Ratko Mladić. These men have not yet been caught, leaving BiH short of the
necessary requirements for PfP. And yet NATO offered membership, presumably
then for political reasons only.
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While the political nature of the decision is not likely to impede reform, the
perception that the decision was political could detract from the aforementioned
political motivation.
Regardless of perceptions, though, PfP undoubtedly offers BiH unprecedented
opportunity. High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling describes the open
door offered to BiH through membership:
The Partnership for Peace is an extremely flexible and innovative
programme designed to facilitate cooperation with partner countries to
extend the zone of peace and stability in Europe. It consists of
practical, bilateral activities between individual partner countries and
NATO that allow partner countries to develop their own relationship
with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. Ultimately,
therefore, it is what its members make of it.lxxxviii
Hopefully BiH will take advantage of the opportunities to increase Euro-Atlantic
engagements and to use the specialized nature of the Program to find its own niche in
NATO in the hopes of future membership. By bringing BiH closer to its goal of
NATO membership, hopefully politicians will continue to work as hard as they have
on the defense reforms to further implement the reform.
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CONCLUSIONS

When inviting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia to join the
Partnership for Peace last month, NATO included a signal to the countries that further
reform and cooperation is still necessary:
[W]e reaffirm the importance we attach to the values and principles set
out in the EAPC and PfP basic documents…We will closely monitor
their respective efforts in this regard.lxxxix
NATO will not let BiH slip into NATO without seeing further improvements. While
the tasks ahead in order to continue implementation of reform and increase
cooperation with NATO through PfP and to all other standards for NATO
membership, challenges also create opportunities, and here Bosnia and Herzegovina
must take advantage of the opportunity to prove its capacity on the international stage.
But how can BiH prove its capacity internationally if its institutions have yet
to prove it at home? The Parliamentary Assembly in particular has an increasing
capacity to oversee military matters and to effect change in the country. However, if it
doesn’t use the capacity it has spent so much time building, then what indeed is the
point of all that work?
The MPs, especially those who sit on the Joint Committee on Defense and
Security, need to first identify key places where implementation has been blocked or
slowed such as the transfer of property and the many budget setbacks. Then it needs
to take a critical stand on these issues and press the government to make the necessary
adjustments. It can create the necessary pressure through a holding hearing or inquiry,
blocking appointments, withholding budget requests, or making political deals based
on legislation the government needs to see passed.
The PA has the capacity to take these steps. It has the necessary expertise, the
backing of relevant laws, and the structure and highly respected reputation of the Joint
Committee.
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One issue now is whether or not it has the political will to follow through with
its critical measures. With the political success of the reforms now formally backed
by the international community through the PfP membership invitation, the MPs can
ride the optimism wave to find the public support it needs, which for a representative
body is key.
The second concern is whether or not the international community will
support the critical measures. While constantly calling for democratic oversight, the
IC has not recently proved to offer widespread support for the PA. As one defense
expert told me regarding the idea of a parliamentary hearing on matters of defense
reform, the international community does “push for democratic control, [but] there’s a
limit…The international community probably doesn’t want to be asked certain
questions.”xc Therefore, the PA will have to assess if such a public display is worth
the risk of losing some support from the international community both for the
duration of the hearing and possibly for the future. If the PA believes that risk is not
worth taking, then it should certainly not back down but rather look toward the other
suggested avenues of parliamentary power.
If the PA can prove that it has power behind its words and is willing to take
action to effect change rather than sitting by watching while its hard-earned
legislative reforms disappear in a political pit of implementation, then it will prove to
the international community, and more importantly to the BiH government and
citizens that it is ready for the world stage.
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Personal Reflections
I was surprised to find that there was not a noticeable divide between the opinions of
Bosnians and of members of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
That is not to say all opinions were all the same, but rather that they were not divided
by citizenship. If nothing else, this aspect proves the teamwork that existed in the
formation and implementation of defense reform. This was not a case of the
international community imposing reform on BiH as has been suggested was the case
with the recent attempts at police reform. Without a doubt, cooperation was a major
key to the success of defense reform.
However, I was disappointed with the international community’s general attitude of
“someone else will do it” concerning supporting the capacity building of the
parliamentary assembly. Often the reasons given for lack of significant engagement
with the PA was that the institution’s focus was elsewhere, on the practical
implementation of reforms, for example.
While this reasoning is worth consideration because no organization can do
everything, I wonder about the reasoning behind these institutions’ priorities. The
international community as a whole talks so much about democratic control, that it
seems it would be a top priority. And maybe it is on paper. But democratic control is
not likely to appear on its own, not even gradually. The IC should take more action to
help boost the potential of the Parliamentary Assembly, should encourage the PA to
be more critical, and should support it when it does just that.
The IC should act this way first of all to act like it means what it says, but also to
improve the independent functioning of the Bosnian governmental institutions. If the
IC concerns itself solely with the implementation of reform itself, of dealing with
property issues and whether or not the defense budget can afford a helicopter, then the
Bosnian government is losing an opportunity to make these decisions on its own.
When certain international institutions pull out such as the OHR and when the ones
left quit handholding, what capacity will the Bosnian government have? The new
political tradition will not be to ask, “what would the IC do?” but “why isn’t the IC
doing it?”
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